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INTRODUCTION
The fact that the word "sprawl" is uttered by curling the upper lip into a
snarl captures some of the emotion generated by the current debate over
American land use policy. Two recent books- Robert Bruegmann's defense of
sprawl and Joel Kotkin's ambitious but short history of great cities'-provide
an opportunity to consider sprawl's costs and benefits and also to examine the
case for legal efforts to curtail sprawl in order to save our cities. These are
important questions because, as Bruegmann observes, calls for "stopping"
sprawl may proceed from serious misconceptions about its extent, causes, and
consequences; they also may systematically underestimate the risks attendant
to growth management.
Bruegmann's descriptive account of suburbia, Sprawl: A Compact History,
which proceeds on the assumption that dense areas are not sprawling ones, is
informative and, at times, surprising. (For example, the densest urbanized area
in the United States is Los Angeles.2) Bruegmann's most important
contribution, however, is to place the current debate over the distributional
consequences of suburban growth controls in historical perspective.
Bruegmann documents that all cities sprawl, in part because residents have
long sought to escape the negatives of urban life when it has become possible
for them to do so.3 And, because city life is most difficult for the poor,
Bruegmann argues, sprawl does not exacerbate economic inequities but
mitigates them.4 Ultimately, however, Bruegmann undermines the strength of
his arguments about the benefits of suburbs by expressing a total lack of
concern for the fate of American cities. A "so what" tone pervades his book, in
large part because he views the city-suburb divide as an artificial one. Suburbs,
in his view, are simply a less dense form of "urban" development.' Yet it is
possible to agree with Bruegmann that American suburbs are neither bad nor
out of control and still to believe that the line between "city" and "sprawl" is
1. ROBERT BRUEGMANN, SPRAWL: A CoMPAcT HISTORY (2005); JOEL KOTKIN, THE C=TY: A
GLOBAL HISTORY (2005).
2. Density in the Los Angeles area rose 26.4% between 195o and 199o; in 2000, the area's
overall density was over 7000 people per square mile, nearly twice as dense as the Chicago
area and significantly denser than the New York area. BRUEGMANN, supra note i, at 64-65.
3. See id. at 21-32 (discussing early sprawl); id. at 73-80 (discussing sprawl outside the United
States).
4. See id. at 215-19 (discussing winners and losers of suburban growth controls).
5. See id. at 18 (describing the historical urbanization process as encompassing sprawl).
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not simply a matter of density.6 Cities, by virtue of their mixed land use
patterns (and perhaps also their greater densities) may be different, in valuable
and important ways, from suburbs. Moreover, even people who endorse
Bruegmann's view that cities and suburbs are simply flip sides of the same
urban development coin may harbor concerns about the urban poor, many of
whom live in cities not by choice but because they have no choice. Thus,
Bruegmann's refusal to countenance arguments that cities are worth saving
may leave many readers asking if he is telling only part of the story.
Joel Kotkin's short history of urban life, The City: A Global History, begins
to fill in these gaps in Bruegmann's book. Bruegmann's work is the stronger of
the two; Kotkin's book is not, nor is it intended to be, an academic treatment
of cities. But Kotkin offers a critical insight worthy of serious consideration in
the academic debate about American land use policy. Like Bruegmann, Kotkin
disfavors limits on suburban growth.7 But he also makes a strong case that
cities can serve unique economic and social purposes. Cities, Kotkin argues, are
"sacred, safe, and busy" places. That is, they inspire awe, serve as centers of
community and economic life, and keep their citizens secure.8 Most of Kotkin's
book is devoted to describing how various kinds of cities-Muslim and
Christian, Eastern and Western-have historically fulfilled these important
functions. But a clear contribution of his book is to ask why so many modern
American cities now fulfill none of them. In fact, social critic James Howard
Kuntsler might well have been describing Detroit, Cleveland, or St. Louis,
when he complained that American suburbs are "soulless[,] ... demoralizing"
places that "disable[] whole classes of decent, normal citizens." 9
6. There is a serious definitional challenge posed by any discussion of "sprawl": Should sprawl
be measured by population densities (Bruegmann's choice)? By the total amount of land
consumed by development? By the extent of development outside of major cities'
boundaries? Or by land use patterns (for example, mixed-use versus single-use
development)? Throughout the book, Bruegmann uses the Census Bureau's statistics for
"urbanized areas"-areas "with a strong connection back to the central population centers
and more than 1,ooo people per square mile"-to describe trends in urban and suburban
development. Id. at 61. These statistics do not map onto the more familiar "metropolitan
areas," nor do they provide a useful dividing line between center cities and suburbia. Id. at
6o-6i (explaining why statistics for "urbanized areas" are more useful in determining
densities than statistics for "metropolitan areas" or municipalities).
7. See Joel Kotkin, Suburbia: Homeland of the American Future, NEXT Am. CITY, Summer 2006,
at 19, available at http://www.americancity.org/article.php?id-article=183 (criticizing growth
management).
8. See KOTKIN, supra note i, at xix-xxii.
9. JAMES HOWARD KUNTSLER, HOME FROM NOWHERE: REMAKING OUR EVERYDAY WORLD FOR
THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 112 (1996).
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The final Part of this Review uses Kotkin's "sacred, safe, and busy" formula
as a template for considering what might be done to save cities without
stopping the suburbs. Kotkin's work challenges city leaders to engage in
serious soul-searching about what they might do to make city life attractive
and enlivening, both for suburbanites and for their current residents. Many
scholars assume that cities are so enfeebled, so systematically disadvantaged, as
to be incapable of competing with suburbs.' ° Yet, despite the steady
progression of suburban sprawl, many cities have experienced a comeback in
recent years." Kotkin makes a plausible case that renewed city fortunes are the
result of cities' own efforts to better compete with suburbs, especially by
seeking to restore a basic sense of security in urban neighborhoods."2 As Kotkin
observes, however, safety is not enough. Cities must also be busy places and
provide some modern version of "sacred" spaces. Here, land use scholars (and
city government leaders) have much to learn from the inward-looking
approach championed by order-maintenance scholars. 3 Just as reforms to city
policing practices make residents feel safer, city leaders should ask whether
reforms to city land use policies could help restore social and economic vitality
to our urban cores. If cities are to thrive, then they must demonstrate (contra
Bruegmann) that the city-suburb distinction is about more than population
densities-that cities serve social, cultural, and economic functions that
suburbs do not. An important way to do so, in my view, is to guarantee that
city land use policies enable city leaders to capitalize on urban distinctiveness.
One important path to that goal, explored below, may be permissive land use
reforms in our cities, rather than prohibitory ones in the suburbs.
10. See, e.g., Richard Briffault, The Local Government Boundary Problem in Metropolitan Areas, 48
STAN. L. REV. 1115, 1136-37 (1996) ("Less affluent localities are nominally free to compete ....
but if they start out having less to offer in terms of high quality services or low taxes there is,
in practice, relatively little they can do to attract the affluent or increase their per capita tax
base.").
11. See generally Patrick A. Simmons & Robert E. Lang, The Urban Turnaround, in 1 REDEFINING
URBAN AND SUBURBAN AMERICA: EVIDENCE FROM CENSUS 2000, at 51, 54 (Bruce Katz &
Robert E. Lang eds., 2003) (finding that the 199os was the best postwar decade for cities);
Rebecca R. Sohmer & Robert E. Lang, Downtown Rebound, in 1 REDEFINING URBAN AND
SUBURBAN AMERICA, supra, at 63, 65-70 (providing statistical evidence that many downtown
areas of major cities experienced population gains during the 199os).
12. See KOTKIN, supra note i, at 154-55;'see also infra notes 98-11o and accompanying text
(discussing the order-maintenance agenda).
13. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REv. 349
(1997); Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan, Law and (Norms of) Order in the Inner City, 32
LAw& Soc'y REV. 805 (1998).
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I. DON'T STOP THE SUBURBSI
Robert Bruegmann is a historian who argues like a lawyer. He uses
historical evidence to challenge the conventional wisdom about suburban
sprawl and to build a case against legal restrictions on suburban growth. While
Bruegrnann's case for sprawl is not without flaws, 4 he does mount an
important challenge to several commonly held assumptions about suburban
development. Sprawl, Bruegmann argues, is not a postwar American anomaly;
it is a universal fact of all urbanized societies.'" (Indeed, many of today's
"urban" neighborhoods are old "suburban" communities, absorbed by cities
through annexation.' 6 ) Sprawl also is not out of control. On the contrary, the
decentralization of American cities peaked decades ago, and many of our
urbanized areas are now becoming denser. 7 And his central point: sprawl is
not a negative reflection of Americans' selfish souls, but rather a natural result
of affluence that benefits even those of the most modest means. Contrary to the
assertions of growth-control proponents, Bruegmann argues that suburban
development maximizes overall social welfare by opening up a housing safety
valve that helps even the poor.18 The case that Bruegmann builds for sprawl,
however, is partially undermined by his nonchalant attitude about our cities.
A. Natural, Universal, and Good
The animating thesis of Bruegmann's book is that sprawl is natural,
universal, and good. To the extent that we think otherwise, Bruegmann argues,
it is because we misunderstand sprawl (or perhaps because we have been
misled by sprawl's opponents). Moreover, and more importantly, Bruegmann
demonstrates that the costs of urban life have always fallen disproportionately
on the poor, and, therefore, that those of moderate means have the most to
14. Bruegmann's effort to rebut the environmentalist critique of sprawl, for example, could be
stronger. He argues that sprawl's environmental consequences have been overstated-both
because we are hardly in danger of running out of space and because most suburban
developments consume agricultural lands that are themselves artificial places with negative
environmental consequences (for example, erosion and pesticide use). But he tends to gloss
over other difficulties, including the externalities generated by excessive automobile use. See
BRUEGMANN, supra note I, at 58-73, 138-51.
15. See id. at 6-12, 17-20.
16. See, e.g., KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF THE
UNITED STATES 138-56 (1985) (discussing the rise and decline of urban annexation efforts).
17. See BRUEGMANN,supra note i, at 58-73.
18. See id. at 109-12.
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gain from suburban development. He then connects this historical argument to
more familiar ones about the economic costs of growth management.
1. Sprawl in Historical Perspective
As Bruegmann carefully documents, sprawl -that is, low-density suburban
development- "has been a persistent feature in cities since the beginning of
urban history."19 Bruegmann argues that most cities experience similar
development patterns over time. During periods of rapid economic growth,
urban densities increase, but when the economy matures and residents become
more affluent, urban densities decrease and suburban growth increases.2 °
Bruegmann uses a demographic tool - the density gradient - to illustrate this
phenomenon. A density gradient graphically depicts population densities from
the center of a city outward. Over time, Bruegmann argues, the density
gradients of all wealthy cities flatten out -that is, center-city densities decrease
and suburban densities increase.21 According to Bruegmann, for example,
nineteenth-century suburbia developed along similar lines in the United States
and Europe. Most suburban districts were home to the affluent; working class
residents occupied smaller, denser, suburban pockets; and, as transportation
technology developed, more commuter suburbs began to dot the countryside.
In the twentieth century, suburbia exploded. By the 192os, in both Europe and
the United States, thousands of middle class families were able to move to
detached and semi-detached suburban homes.'
Bruegmann also builds a strong case against the prevailing view that
suburban development patterns in the United States depart dramatically from
those in other industrialized nations. While the density gradients of older,
European cities flattened more slowly than younger, American cities,
suburbanization and decentralization trends in the United States and Europe
have been converging since the 1970S. 3 One reason for the convergence,
Bruegmann argues, is that American sprawl appears to be slowing and, in some
places, even reversing itself. Bruegmann documents how the decentralization
19. Id. at 18.
zo. See id. at 24.
21. See id. at i9; see also id. at 91 (comparing the density gradients of modern European and
American cities).
22. See id. at 35-36; see aso JACKSON, supra note 16, at 116-37 (describing the democratization of
suburban development in early-twentieth-century America); DOUGLAS W. RAE, CITY:
URBANISM AND ITS END 230-34 (2003) (describing early suburban development in
Connecticut).
23. See BRUEGMANN, supra note 1, at 90-93.
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of urban areas in the United States-measured by consumption of land per
person-peaked by the 1950s. Since then, while population growth continues
to push the outer edge of urbanized areas farther from city centers, overall
population densities of urbanized areas have been rising, primarily because
suburban land use patterns are becoming more intense.'
2. Sprawl as a Safety Valve
Bruegmann's most important contribution is to highlight how suburbs
have long served as a housing safety valve, improving the living conditions of
both the wealthy and those of very moderate means. By demonstrating how
the poor disproportionately bear the costs of urban life, Bruegmann places a
human face on the longstanding economic debate over the wisdom of
restricting suburban growth. Growth-control skeptics rely on a very simple
economic calculus: restricting the supply of land available for development will
increase its price. And, if the price of land rises, the price of the structures built
on it-including, importantly, housing-will rise as well. Suburban growth
restrictions might also slow the housing filtering process, by which a wealthier
individual moving to a larger house sets off a "chain of moves" that increases
the availability of quality housing for poor and moderate-income individuals.2"
Michael Schill succinctly summarized the problem as follows: "The Achilles'
heel of the 'smart growth' movement is the impact that many of the proposals
put forth by its advocates would have on affordable housing."26
Moreover, most growth restrictions are imposed by local governments that,
as Charles Tiebout influentially predicted, use tax and regulatory policies
(including land use policies) to compete for "consumer-voters."27 Many
24. See id. at 6o-69 (discussing possible causes of increasing suburban densities, including
smaller lot sizes, a greater diversity of suburban housing types, and land recycling or
"teardown" efforts).
25. See, e.g., Brian J.L. Berry, Ghetto Expansion and Single-Family Housing Prices: Chicago, 1968-
1972, 3 J. URB. ECON. 397, 417 (1976) (arguing that suburbanization led to a massive chain of
moves, which mitigated the price effects of racial discrimination in urban Chicago and
enabled many families to improve their living situations); John C. Weicher, Private
Production: Has the Rising Tide Lifted All Boats?, in HOUSING AMERICA'S POOR 45 (Peter D.
Salins ed., 1987) (describing the filtering process).
26. Michael H. Schill, Comment on Richard P. Voith & David L. Crawford's Smart Growth and
Affordable Housing, in GROWTH MANAGEMENT AND AFFORDABLE HOUSING: Do THEY
CONFLICT? 102, 102 (Anthony Downs ed., 2004).
27. Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416,417-20 (1956);
see also WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS: How HOME VALUES INFLUENCE
LocAL GOVERNMENT TAXATION, SCHOOL FINANCE AND LAND-USE POLICIES 65-68 (2001)
(discussing the role of land use policies in Tiebout's model); Bruce W. Hamilton, Zoning
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economists applaud this competition, arguing that it subjects localities to some
approximation of market forces.28  Other commentators warn that
municipalities frequently compete by excluding unwanted residents and land
uses, including affordable multifamily housing.29 Growth controls are an
attractive exclusionary device because limits on all new development serve the
double purpose of excluding disfavored land uses (and questionable new
neighbors) and making existing homes a scarcer, and therefore more valuable,
resource.3° And because existing homeowners tend to be "richer" and "whiter"
than renters, the results of exclusion are frequendy regressive.
31
Many land use and local government scholars favor centralizing control
over development policy at the state or regional level, in part to curtail local
governments' exclusionary tendencies. 32 There are reasons to worry, however,
that centralized growth management policies might exacerbate, rather than
and Property Taxation in a System of Local Governments, 12 URB. STUD. 205 (1975) (discussing
the importance of zoning to local tax policy); J. Vernon Henderson, Community
Development: The Effects of Growth and Uncertainty, 70 AM. ECON. REV. 894 (198o)
(discussing the role of land use policies in Tiebout's model).
28. See, e.g., Wallace E. Oates, The Many Faces of the Tiebout Model, in THE TIEBOUT MODEL AT
FIFTY: ESSAYS IN PUBLIC ECONOMICS IN HONOR OF WALLACE OATES 21 (William A. Fischel
ed., 2006) (comprehensively surveying empirical literature testing the Tiebout hypothesis);
see also MARK SCHNEIDER, THE COMPETITIVE CITY: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF SUBURBIA
62-69 (1989) (purporting to find that tax rates are lower in more fragmented metropolitan
areas); John D. Donahue, Tiebout? Or Not Tiebout?: The Market Metaphor and America's
Devolution Debate, J. ECON. PERSP., Autumn 1997, at 73, 74 ("Diverse policy regimes can cater
to heterogeneous preferences .... ); Robert P. Inman & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, The Political
Economy of Federalism, in PERSPECTIVES ON PUBuC CHOICE 73, 83-85 (Dennis C. Mueller ed.,
1997) (arguing that interlocal competition will increase efficiency in the production of public
goods).
29. See, e.g., Lee Anne Fennell, Exclusion's Attraction: Land Use Controls in Tieboutian Perspective,
in THE TIEBOUT MODEL AT FIFTY, supra note 28, at 163, 177 ("Tiebout's ideas cannot be fully
appreciated without taking into account the place of exclusion both as an attractive item...
available to consumer-voters and as a constraint on the choice sets that consumer-voters
encounter.").
30. See, e.g., Vicki Been, Impact Fees and Housing Affordability, 8 CITYSCAPE: J. POL'y DEV. & RES.
139, 146 (2005) (discussing the literature); Robert C. Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls:
An Economic and Legal Analysis, 86 YALE L.J. 385, 400 (1977) ("Antigrowth measures have
one premier class of beneficiaries: those who already own residential structures in the
municipality doing the excluding."); William A. Fischel, An Economic History of Zoning and a
Cure for Its Exclusionary Effects, 41 URB. STUD. 317, 331 (2004) (arguing that growth controls
are a form of exclusionary zoning).
31. See Lee Anne Fennell, Homes Rule, 112 YALE L.J. 617, 628 (2002) (book review).
32. See, e.g., ROBERT H. FREILICH, FROM SPRAWL TO SMART GROWTH: SUCCESSFUL LEGAL,
PLANNING, AND ENVIRONMENTAL SYSTEMS (199); ARTHUR C. NELSON & JAMES B. DUNCAN
WITH CLANCY J. MULLEN & KIRK R. BISHOP, GROWTH MANAGEMENT PRINCIPLES AND
PRACTICES (1995); DOUGLAS R. PORTER, MAKING SMART GROWTH WORK (2002).
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mitigate, the price effects of suburban growth restrictions. Importantly, local
growth controls may promote suburban sprawl because the exclusion of new
growth by wealthier inner suburbs pushes development outward.33 One benefit
of this pattern is that new development on the suburban fringe may mitigate
the price effects of growth controls in inner suburbs. Thus, comprehensive
growth management might be expected to increase overall regional housing
prices more than local controls.3 4 Empirical evidence on the price effects of
existing regional planning programs is mixed,3" and proponents argue that
planning tools- such as housing linkage, inclusionary zoning, density bonuses,
impact-fee waivers, and mixed-use zoning-can increase the supply of
affordable housing.36 There is little question, however, that such programs
carry a significant risk of reducing housing affordability.
33. See WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, LINCOLN INST. OF LAND POLICY, Do GROWTH CONTROLS MATTER?
A REVIEW OF EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON THE EFFECTIVENESS AND EFFICIENCY OF LOCAL
GOVERNMENT LAND USE REGULATION 53-57 (1990) ("[G]rowth controls probably cause
metropolitan areas to be too spread out."); Q. Shen, Spatial Impacts of Locally Enacted Growth
Controls: The San Francisco Bay Region in the 1980s, 23 ENV'T & PLAN. B: PLAN. & DESIGN 61,
86 (1996) (finding that local controls pushed development to unrestricted areas).
34. See, e.g., Vicki Been, "Exit" as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions: Rethinking the
Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 473, 509-28 (1991) (arguing that
competition between municipalities may reduce their ability to exact concessions from
developers); Nicole Stelle Garnett, Trouble Preserving Paradise?, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 158, 165-
68 (2001) (observing that affordable- housing advocates in Arizona and Colorado organized
to oppose statewide growth management proposals due to concerns about housing
affordability); Arthur C. Nelson et al., The Link Between Growth Management and Housing
Affordabiliry: The Academic Evidence, in GROWTH MANAGEMENT AND AFFORDABLE HOUSING,
supra note 26, at 117, 127-28 (predicting that regional growth management policies will have
greater price effects than local policies, which permit housing consumers to migrate to
uncontrolled jurisdictions).
35. For example, growth management proponents frequently cite evidence that Portland's
longstanding regional growth management program has not directly increased housing
prices. (Housing prices have skyrocketed in Portland, but it is unclear whether the increase
can be attributed to growth management.) See GERRIT KNAAP & ARTHUR C. NELSON, THE
REGULATED LANDSCAPE: LESSONS ON STATE LAND USE PLANNING FROM OREGON 39, 51-58
(1992) (discussing conflicting evidence on the price effects of Oregon's comprehensive
growth management program); Nelson et al., supra note 34, at 134-58 (reviewing the
empirical literature suggesting that rising housing prices in Portland are not linked to
growth management, but acknowledging the risks of such programs); see also BRUEGMANN,
supra note i, at 209-12 (discussing the debate); FISCHEL, supra note 27, at 257 (discussing the
possibility of a connection between rising housing prices in Washington-including those of
units originally set aside as "affordable" -and statewide growth management programs).
36. See, e.g., Richard P. Voith & David L. Crawford, Smart Growth and Affordable Housing, in
GROWTH MANAGEMENT AND AFFORDABLE HOUSING, supra note 26, at 82, 86-1oo. But see
Robert C. Ellickson, The Irony of "Inclusionary" Zoning, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 1167, 1184-85
(1981) (arguing that inclusionary zoning will reduce the supply of affordable housing);
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Bruegmann recounts these economic arguments,37 but his work also makes
a qualitative case against the view that the urban poor are victims of suburban
growth (and therefore will be the beneficiaries of efforts to slow it). Until
recently, Bruegmann argues, urban life generally was an unpleasant necessity:
even after the residents no longer needed walls to shield them from bandits and
marauders, the lack of effective transportation required them to live in close
proximity to work and to one another. But overcrowding, disease, substandard
city services, and poor public infrastructure made cities unpleasant and
dangerous places to live. Bruegmann observes, moreover, that urban life has
always been particularly difficult for the poor. Until the early twentieth
century, the population densities of most thriving cities approximated 150,000
people per square mile (200 people per acre). 8 Poorer neighborhoods,
however, were much denser. Since ancient times, wealthy urban residents were
able to purchase the luxury of space-leaving the poor crammed into
dangerous and disease-ridden slums. For example, the population density of
Manhattan Island peaked in 1910 at io6,ooo people per square mile.39 During
the same period, densities in the poor, immigrant ghettos on the Lower East
Side exceeded "400,000 people per square mile or more than six hundred
people per acre."
4°
Against this backdrop, Bruegmann carefully documents how suburban
development has long served as a safety valve for the urban poor. The suburbs
of preindustrial cities, as discussed above, tended to house those too poor to
afford housing in cities.41 The social and economic dislocations of the industrial
revolution, however, reversed this trend. Industrialization both increased city
densities and also drove more residents to flee the unpleasant and dangerous
aspects of urban life. 42 While early suburban developments catered primarily to
the wealthy and the burgeoning middle class, 43 smaller, denser pockets of
Schill, supra note 26, at 103 ("[M]ost of the popular support for smart growth is based upon
a variety of factors that will create strong incentives for municipalities to adopt growth
restrictions without simultaneously promoting affordable housing.").
37. BRUEGMANN, supra note 1, at 202-15.
38. Id. at 22.
39. Demographia, City of New York & Boroughs: Population & Population Density from 1790,
http://www.demographia.com/dm-nyc.htm (last visited Nov. 11, 2006).
40. BRUEGMANN, supra note 1, at 26-27.
41. Id. at 23.
42. Id. at 26-27.
43. See id. at 27-29 (discussing early suburban development in Europe and the United States);
see also JACKSON, supra note 16, at 20-116 (documenting suburban development in the
United States).
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suburban development housing poorer laborers also developed. The
standardization of building methods and the development of inexpensive
public transportation enabled these residents to move farther away from city
centers into even less dense communities.' The democratization of suburbia
was particularly pronounced in the United States, where detached suburban
homes became an option for people of very modest means by the end of the
19 20S.
45 Bruegmann strenuously resists the characterization of late-twentieth-
century suburban development as an "unprecedented" departure from earlier
historical patterns. The postwar economic boom, in his view, simply enabled
more people than ever before to take advantage of the benefits of suburban
life.46
B. Let the Cities Die?
Robert Bruegmann's book makes many important contributions to the
current academic and political debates about the costs and benefits of suburban
sprawl. It is a valuable addition to the voluminous land use literature-well-
researched, well-written, thought-provoking, and full of captivating history
and surprising data on urban development, both here and abroad. But
Bruegmann's unorthodox views on the connections between cities and their
suburbs will likely prove a stumbling block for many readers. Bruegmann tries
to convince readers that it is illogical to care about cities qua cities. Cities and
suburbs are simply different types of urban development; suburban increase
and urban decrease both are naturally occurring economic phenomena. 47 For
example, when discussing cities' future prospects, Bruegmann observes that
the fortunes of many center cities and older suburbs improved over the past
two decades (although the extent of the improvement is subject to debate).48
Bruegmann posits several possible explanations, all of them in keeping with his
general view that cities and suburbs are simply different dots on the same
44. See BRUEGMANN, supra note I, at 25-28; see also JACKSON, supra note 16, at 116-38.
45. See BRUEGMANN, supra note i, at 36; see also JACKSON, supra note 16, at 103-37 (describing the
democratization of suburban development in early-twentieth-century America); RAE, supra
note 22, at 230-31 (describing early suburban development in Connecticut).
46. See BRUEGMANN, supra note i, at 44-45.
47. See id. at 54 ("[M]any central cities have been thoroughly transformed as part of the same
decentralization process that has been at work throughout metropolitan regions. They
participate just as fully in sprawl as the farthest subdivisions.").
48. See Edward L. Glaeser & Jesse M. Shapiro, City Growth: Which Places Grew and Why, in 1
REDEFINING URBAN AND SUBURBAN AMERICA, supra note ii, at 13, 18-30 (discussing factors
affecting urban growth in the 199os); Simmons & Lang, supra note ii, at 54-58 (discussing
population gains in previously declining cities).
609
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
urban development continuum. He notes, for example, that at the very time
that city prospects looked bleakest, "nostalgia for the historical city" converged
with the declining "exclusivity" of suburbia. 49 Moreover, he argues that the
very economic changes lamented by many scholars- including the decline in
the urban industrial base° -ultimately may save the cities. Freed from the
congestion, pollution, and disease that once characterized urban life, cities have
become more attractive to wealthy individuals who might previously have
chosen to live in the suburbs."1 As a result, he suggests, "[i]t is quite possible
that sprawl could recede everywhere as more citizens become affluent enough
to live like the residents of the Upper East Side," because "as individuals pass
from affluent to extraordinarily affluent they are better able to enjoy the
benefits of density without the negative side effects." 2 Perhaps, he opines,
"some attractive central cities will become essentially resort areas filled with
second homes." 3
Bruegmann's refusal to countenance arguments that cities are worth
worrying about is also linked to his belief that much anti-sprawl sentiment is
motivated by an elite distaste for the aesthetics and culture of suburban life.
"'Sprawl,"' he asserts, "like 'conspicuous consumption' or 'elitism,' has always
conveyed a not-so-subtle accusation against the way that other people choose
to live their lives."54 He argues that sprawl first became a political issue when
commoners began to invade countryside previously enjoyed exclusively by the
wealthy"5 and asserts that modern anti-sprawl sentiment results in part from
the further democratization of sprawl. Bruegmann observes that "the chorus of
complaints about growth swelled during the boom periods," as in eighteenth-
49. BRUEGMANN, supra note 1, at 53.
5o. E.g., WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS: THE WORLD OF THE NEW URBAN
POOR 25-35 (1996) (linking inner-city crisis to decline in the urban industrial base).
51. See BRUEGMANN, supra note 1, at 53-54. This gentrification process was aided by the
development of a new property form - the condominium - that enabled people to combine
urban living and the benefits of home ownership. See id. (discussing the role of the
condominium in urban development); see also Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith,
Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 11o YALE L.J.
1, 15-16 (2000) (describing the "dramatic development" of condominiums in the 196os).
52. BRUEGMANN, supra note 1, at 221.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 18.
55. Bruegmann's discussion of elite opposition to London's eighteenth-century suburban
growth is particularly withering. He quotes one horrified detractor with great effect: "We
are making a screaming mess of England.... A gimcrack civilization crawls like a gigantic
slug over the country, leaving a foul trail of slime behind it." 1d. at 117.
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century London and late-twentieth-century Atlanta. 6 Bruegmann further
speculates that suburbia tends to lose its "social cachet" when less affluent,
formerly urban residents arrive.57 Opponents frequently deride the polluting
influence of "McMansions," cookie-cutter houses, and strip malls-places that
provide shelter and services for the masses, yet are described as a "lethal
disease" by leading anti-sprawl activists.8
Bruegmann also critiques sprawl opponents for supporting policies that
have the effect of decreasing densities in both cities and suburbs, including
restrictions on "teardowns" in older, inner-ring suburbs (in the name of
community preservation)59 and the "downzon[ing]" of city neighborhoods to
reduce their population.6' But other examples abound. As Schill has observed,
"[M]any inner-city residents would be happy not to have new neighbors, new
barriers to their views, and new competitors for parking spaces...
Community opposition to new development manifests itself every day in
opposition to rezoning, drawn-out land use and environmental approval
procedures, and endless lawsuits, meritorious and frivolous ....,"6 Opponents
of suburban sprawl have opposed urban infill development, citing concerns





and the loss of urban green space. 61 The Attorney General of New York went
so far as to file a lawsuit seeking to freeze construction of nearly 3ooo new
apartments that threatened community gardens .64 Elsewhere, environmentalists
express concerns that new infill developments featuring affordable, multifamily
56. Id. at 165.
57. Id. at 53.
58. Id. at 151, 164.
sg. Id. at 69-70.
60. Id. at 57-58.
61. Schill, supra note 26, at 104.
62. Nicholas Confessore, Cities Grow Up, and Some See Sprawl, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 6, 2006, S 4
(Week in Review), at 3 (describing opposition to infill in New York City).
63. See Trip Pollard, Greening the American Dream?, PLANNING, Oct. 2001, at io, 12 (discussing
environmentalists' mixed feelings about infill); Chris Poynter, Neighbors Oppose Plans To
Build Up Instead of Out, COURIER-J. (Louisville), Nov. 21, 2002, at Ai (discussing opposition
to an infill project); Nancy Salem, Infil Imbroglio, ALBUQUERQUE TRIB., Oct. 4, 1999, at B3
(discussing one group's response to developer complaints about the impediments to
downtown infill projects, including neighbor opposition and regulatory hurdles); see also
Steve Twomey, Here Comes (There Goes) a Neighborhood, WASH. POST MAG., July 2, 2000, at
W8 (discussing neighbor opposition to infill projects as an impediment to slowing
suburban growth).
64. See Jennifer Steinhauer, Ending a Long Battle, New York Lets Housing and Gardens Grow, N.Y.
TIMEs, Sept. 19, 2002, atAi.
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housing units create significant health risks,6 5 and they complain that subsidies
for urban "brownfield" redevelopment are "corporate welfare." 66 These efforts,
Bruegmann argues, suggest that much anti-sprawl sentiment simply reflects a
desire to stop all development, rather than to promote denser development.
They also raise serious questions about whether political leaders will be able to
muster the will to promote the regulatory tools needed to counter possible
regressive effects of growth management, including, importantly, density
bonuses for urban-infill and affordable-housing projects.
Bruegmann may be right about the motives of some sprawl opponents, and
one or more of his positive predictions about city health may come to pass.
Still, his nonchalant attitude about the fate of central cities is unsettling, even
for growth management skeptics. His case against restrictions on suburban
growth would have been far more convincing had he proffered some realistic
alternative -other than good luck-for saving our cities. It is safe to assume
that many readers come to Bruegmann's book convinced that something
should be done about American cities. They are not likely to come away from it
unconvinced, but they may come away wondering whether growth
management proponents are correct after all: if we want to save our cities, we
need to stop our suburbs.
II. SACRED, SAFE, AND BUSY
Joel Kotkin's short history of urban life, The City: A Global History, is a
useful starting point for thinking about the questions that Bruegmann leaves
unanswered. Kotkin is an excellent writer who clearly loves his subject. On
most technical points, however, Kotkin's treatment of cities pales in
comparison to Bruegmann's exploration of suburbs. Indeed, his ambitious
effort to review the entire global history of urban life lends itself to
superficiality. But The City is not meant for an academic audience. Kotkin's
goal is clearly to inform (and even to inspire) the intelligent layperson, and he
achieves it. The book is a worthy read, especially as a supplement to
Bruegmann's work. It is in many ways fortuitous that the books' publications
coincided, for Kotkin highlights the limitations of Bruegmann's approach,
reminding readers that cities may be worth saving after all. His book also
provides critical insights about changes to urban land use policies that might
65. See John Krist, State Air Guidelines Conflict with 'Smart Growth,' 20 CAL. PLAN. & DEv. RFP. 6
(2005).
66. Editorial, Is Thompson Going Green?, CAP. TIMES (Madison), Feb. 12, 1997, at i2A.
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foster renewed city fortunes without necessitating restrictions on suburban
growth.
A. Sacredness, Safety, and Busyness
Kotkin's central thesis is that healthy cities, throughout history, have been
"sacred, safe, and busy" places. Kotkin's review of how different cities, in
different cultures, served (and, in modern times, have ceased to serve) these
functions is informative and thought-provoking, if unfortunately brief. Until
quite recently, Kotkin observes, most great cities were centers of religious life-
dominated by majestic cathedrals, mosques, or temples, filled with pilgrims
from near and far. 6' The case for modern city "sacredness" is more difficult to
make, but Kotkin believes that it is critically important; modern cities must
continue to serve as "sacred" places that bind their citizens together with a
common purpose and shared values. "Urban areas," he argues, "must be held
together by a consciousness that unites their people in a shared identity. 6 8
Ancient cultures depended on the "priesthood" to enforce this consciousness,
Kotkin observes. But he insists that, if our cities are to thrive, our secular,
individualistic culture must find other ways to build this kind of social
capital. 69
Cities, according to Kotkin, must also be safe. There is little doubt that
urban societies fail unless they guarantee their citizens' safety. As Kotkin
demonstrates, city life has long depended upon two kinds of security-
protection from invading outsiders and protection from deviant insiders. Until
quite recently, urban civilizations' very existence depended upon the ability to
repel invaders. Ancient cities-Assyrian, Greek, Indian, Roman, and
American- developed and flourished when that security was established and
foundered when it failed.7' As Kotkin observes, the rise of city walls once
marked the beginnings of an urban society: when large walled towns first
appeared in China (as early as iiio B.C.E.), the characters for "wall" and for
"city" were identical.7 Even during the Pax Romana, when unprecedented
security enabled the free movement of people, goods, and ideas, many cities-
especially on the frontier -depended upon the protection of walls and
67. See KoT KIN, supra note i, at 4 ("it is difficult, perhaps, to imagine in our current secular era
the degree to which religion played a central role during most of urban history.").
68. Id. at 157.
69. See id. at 158-6o.
70. See id. at ii (describing the fall of ancient civilizations in Asia and the Americas); id. at 20-24
(describing the destruction of Greek civilizations by less sophisticated invaders).
71. Id. at ii.
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legionaries.7" The return of urban life to Europe in the centuries after the fall of
Rome was similarly marked by the erection of a defensive perimeter.
73
Security from outsiders, of course, plays a minor role in modern urban
life -although Kotkin asks in closing whether the modern terrorist threat will
change this reality. 74 While protecting inhabitants from invading outsiders is
no longer their primary function, cities must continue to guarantee their
residents security by adopting and enforcing the rules necessary to protect
them from deviant insiders. As Kotkin observes, many cities in the developing
world are crippled by a lack of internal security. In these places, those citizens
who can afford to do so retreat into guarded, walled suburban enclaves or
emigrate abroad. 71 Only a few decades ago, many people assumed that same
fate eventually would befall American cities. Crime rates rose dramatically
during the 196os and 1970s and stubbornly remained at these unprecedented
levels despite increases in police expenditures. As the crime rate rose, so did
fear of crime, especially in urban areas. During this time, most Americans came
to take ever-spiraling crime rates and crippling fear of urban disorder as a
given.76 By the end of the 198os, many people simply chose to avoid urban
public spaces.77 Kotkin argues - quite plausibly - that efforts to reverse these
trends and to restore citizens' basic sense of security have done much to renew
city prospects in recent years: "One critical element in the late-twentieth-
century revival in some American cities... can be traced to .... the adoption
of new policing methods and a widespread determination to make public safety
the number one priority of government."r7
Finally, Kotkin argues, great cities must be busy. He asserts that urban
centers have long served as centers of economic life. The most successful cities,
according to Kotkin, have permitted commerce to flourish relatively free of
restrictive regulation, and a less-than-robust economy eventually spells urban
doom. Kotkin celebrates the intellectual and economic glories of Asian and
Islamic cities of the Middle Ages; he argues that Islamic society in particular
72. Id. at 32-33.
73. Id. at 66.
74. Id. at 155-57.
75s Id. at 155.
76. See Debra Livingston, Police Discretion and the Quality of Life in Public Places: Courts,
Communities, and the New Policing, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 551, 568-71 (1997).
77. See, e.g., PAUL S. GROGAN & TONY PROSCiO, COMEBACK CITIES 152 (2000) ("Out-of-control
crime was the nearly universal expectation for the inner city. Any other positive trend there
... was sharply hemmed in by the prospect of continued crime and, just as important, an
all-but-unshakable fear of crime.").
78. KOTKIN, supra note 1, at 154-55.
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created a new kind of urban culture and exported it throughout much of the
civilized world.7 Yet these great cities declined at the same time that European
cities triumphed. The reason, he hypothesizes, was that European societies in
the late Middle Ages trended toward a freer economy. According to Kotkin, the
erosion of religious and political restrictions on economic activity fomented
cultural resurgence and the rise of a vast middle class in Europe, ultimately
paving the way toward the triumphant nineteenth- and twentieth-century
industrial cities. 8° Unfortunately (or in Bruegmann's view, inevitably), the
successes and limitations of the industrial cities led to suburbanization and the
decline of urban busyness.8'
B. Avoiding an Ephemeral Future
Kotkin strenuously-and explicitly- rejects Bruegmann's suggestion that
cities might be saved by becoming gentrified playgrounds for the wealthy. 8 He
worries that H.G. Wells's prediction of a century ago may be coming to pass:
"[C]ities may now be morphing... from commanding centers of economic life
toward a more ephemeral role as a 'bazaar, a great gallery of shops and places
of concourse and rendezvous.' 8' Kotkin does not, in my view, devote sufficient
effort to explaining this concern about the fate of American cities. He
apparently worries that many cities, even successful ones, are no longer the
centers of social, cultural, and economic activity that they once were. Kotkin
believes that, to succeed, cities must be "real" places, with real communities,
where people choose to live, work, and raise families -not simply places that
wealthy individuals occasionally visit for entertainment. And he is right that
many cities no longer serve these desired functions. By the 1960s, more
Americans lived in suburbs than central cities ;84 by 1990, the United States had
become a suburban nation, with a solid majority of all Americans residing in
79. See id. at 43-51 (discussing Islamic cities); id. at 52-57 (discussing Asian cities).
go. See id. at 65-70. Ultimately, Kotkin argues, the calcification of an autocratic ruling class in
Islamic and Asian societies led to citizens burdened with confiscatory taxes, limits on
property ownership, and court favoritism. See id. at 58-61.
Si. See id. at 120-22.
82. Id. at 153 (citing Robert Bruegmann, The American City: Urban Aberration or Glimpse of the
Future, in PREPARING FOR THE URBAN FUTURE: GLOBAL PRESSURES AND LOCAL FORCES 59
(Michael A. Cohen et al. eds., 1996)).
83. Id. at 151 (quoting H.G. WELLS, ANTICIPATIONS OF THE REACTIONS OF MECHANICAL AND
SCIENTIFIC PROGRESS UPON HUMAN LIFE AND THOUGHT 32 (1902)).
84. See PETER 0. MULLER, CONTEMPORARY SUBURBAN AMERICA 4 (1981).
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the suburbs."s The employment balance shifted to the suburbs by the mid-
1970S.8 6 In 2000, roughly three out of five jobs in American metropolitan areas
were located in suburbs, with only 22% of people working within three miles of
the center city.s7 Important to Kotkin's concerns about the rise of "ephemeral"
cities, fewer and fewer families - especially middle class families - build their
lives in city neighborhoods. A recent Brookings Institution study of twelve
large metropolitan areas found that only 23% of central-city neighborhoods
had middle-income profiles (compared to 45% in 1970), and, moreover, that
even cities that gained population lost families in general and middle class
families in particular.88
Unfortunately, Kotkin offers no specific reform proposals to help cities
avoid an ephemeral future. Indeed, he does little to explain what is wrong with
ephemeral cities other than to suggest-as discussed more fully below-that
such cities fail to foster the shared norms that he equates with modern
sacredness. His suggestions for shaping cities' future, to the extent that he
offers any, are painted in broad strokes: "cities must emphasize those basic
elements long critical to the making of vital commercial places";89 they must
ensure that their residents "feel at least somewhat secure in their persons"; 90
and they must "occupy[] a sacred place that both orders and inspires the
complex natures of gathered masses of people."9 This is not an agenda for
reform, and his book is made weaker by his failure to offer specifics. But his
exhortation does provide a template for considering the question that both
books leave unanswered: can we save our cities without stopping our suburbs?
85. See Kevin M. Kruse & Thomas J. Sugrue, Introduction to THE NEW SUBURBAN HISTORY 1, 1
(Kevin M. Kruse & Thomas J. Sugrue eds., 2006).
86. See John D. Kasarda, Industrial Restructuring and the Changing Location ofJobs, in 1 STATE OF
THE UNION: AMERICA IN THE 1990S, at 215, 235 (1995).
87. Kotkin, supra note 7.
88. JASON C. BOOZA ET AL., BROOKINGS INST., WHERE DID THEY Go? THE DECLINE OF MIDDLE-
INCOME NEIGHBORI4OODS IN METROPOLITAN AMERICA 1, 9-11 (20o6), available at
htrp://www.brook.edu/metro/pubs/2oo6o622 middleclass.pdf.
89. KOTKIN, supra note i, at 154.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 16o.
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III. SAVING CITIES WITHOUT STOPPING SUBURBS?
Robert Bruegiriann is, in my view, correct to worry about the transitional
fairness questions raised by growth restrictions. 2 The suburbs have long
represented the hope of a better life for the urban poor, and this continues to
be the case today. Smokestacks and overcrowding are no longer poor city
dwellers' primary concerns-crime, education, and employment are. The
suburbs offer the good schools, economic opportunities, and environmental
amenities that wealthy urban dwellers can afford to purchase and poorer
residents cannot.93 Moreover, there has been, in recent years, a promising
trend toward racial and economic diversity in the suburbs.9 4 Regional growth
management proposals to channel development into the urban core could
jeopardize these trends, especially because many of the most diverse
neighborhoods have characteristics that draw the ire of sprawl opponents: they
are located in low-density metropolitan areas in the West and Southwest and
are filled with relatively low-cost "starter homes.""5
Bruegmann, however, mistakenly discounts the two important ways that
cities influence thinking about suburban sprawl. First, both growth-control
and regional-government proponents use the fate of cities to argue that
suburban sprawl is both inefficient and unjust. It is inefficient because it leads
to overinvestment of public resources in roads, schools, services, and utilities
and overconsumption of land at the suburban fringe at the same time that city
services and city lands lie idle. 6 It is unjust because suburbanites' right of exit
permits them to take advantage of the cultural amenities of urban life without
paying for them, and, importantly, to turn their backs on the poorest members
92. See Nicole Stelle Garnett, Unsubsidizing Suburbia, 90 MINN. L. REV. 459, 495-96 (2005)
(book review) (discussing transitional fairness questions raised by restrictions on urban-
suburban mobility); see also Saul Levmore, Changes, Anticipations, and Reparations, 99
COLUM. L. REv. 1657 (1999) (discussing the transitional fairness problem).
93. See, e.g., James E. Ryan & Michael Heise, The Political Economy of School Choice, I11 YALE L.J.
2043, 2102-o8 (2002) (discussing the connection between economic status and educational
achievement); Michael H. Schill, Deconcentrating the Inner City Poor, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
795, 811-21 (1991) (advocating policies that help the urban poor move to suburbs).
94. See, e.g., WILLIAM H. FREY, BROOKINGS INST., DIVERSITY SPREADS OUT: METROPOLITAN
SHIFTS IN HISPANIC, ASIAN, AND BLACK POPULATIONS SINCE 2000 (2006), available at
http://www.brookings.edu/metro/pubs/206o3o7_Frey.pdf.
95. Been, supra note 30, at 164; see William H. Frey, Melting Pot Suburbs: A Study of Suburban
Diversity, in I REDEFINING URBAN AND SUBURBAN AMERICA, supra note ii, at 155.
96. See, e.g., ANTHONY DOWNS, NEW VISIONS FOR METROPOLITAN AMERICA 3-16 (1994);
NELSON & DUNCAN, supra note 32, at 4-6; MYRON ORFIELD, METROPOLITICS: A REGIONAL
AGENDA FOR COMMUNITY AND STABILITY 9-10 (1997); Briffault, supra note io, at 1132-41.
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of what is in reality one metropolitan polity. 97 Even if Bruegmann is correct
about the risks of growth controls and the benefits of suburban growth, it is
reasonable to ask him to explain what should be done-other than restricting
growth-to improve the lives of people who remain in city neighborhoods
because they have few residential choices. After all, as Bruegmann skillfully
demonstrates, the very people whose mobility is most restricted by economic
circumstance are also those likely to find urban life especially difficult. Second,
many sprawl opponents assert that cities, with their higher densities and mixed
land use patterns, are qualitatively different from suburbs. Thus, even if
Bruegmann's descriptive account of suburbia is accurate, cities may serve
unique cultural and economic functions that suburbs cannot. If so, we should
not be content to let the cities die. Bruegmann dismisses these arguments as
elitist, but Kotkin issues a convincing challenge to consider the claim for city
exceptionality.
For both of these reasons, the case against growth controls would be
strengthened by exploring what changes to city policies might help make our
urban areas, in Kotkin's words, "sacred, safe, and busy" once again. This final
Part explores that important question by asking city leaders and land use
scholars to consider the connections between safety and busyness and between
busyness and sacredness.
A. Safety
As Kotkin recounts in his concluding chapter, cities across the country have
enacted myriad policies seeking to curb urban disorder and crime since the
publication of the famously influential Broken Windows essay in 1982.98 The
diverse policies falling under the order-maintenance umbrella differ in detail99
97. See, e.g., DAVID RUSK, CITIES WITHOUT SUBURBS 31-34 (2d ed. 1995); Briffault, supra note lo,
at 1138-41; Sheryll D. Cashin, Localism, Self-Interest, and the Tyranny of the Favored Quarter:
Addressing the Barriers to New Regionalism, 88 GEO. L.J. 1985, 2015 (2000).
98. James Q Wilson & George L. Kelling, Broken Windows, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 1982, at
29; see also Herman Goldstein, Toward Community-Oriented Policing: Potential, Basic
Requirements, and Threshold Questions, 33 CRIME & DELINQ. 6 (1987) (arguing that "[t]he
direction of change in policing has turned an important corner" toward problem-oriented,
crime-prevention, and order-maintenance strategies); Livingston, supra note 76, at 577
("Today, hundreds of police departments across the country... are experimenting with
both community and problem-oriented policing.").
99. For a description of some of the many distinctive strategies, see Livingston, supra note 76, at
573-9 1. See also Dan M. Kahan, Reciprocity, Collective Action, and Community Policing, 90 CAL.
L. REV. 1513, 1527-38 (2002) (describing order-maintenance policing, church-police
collaboration, and selective privatization).
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but proceed from the same assumption-namely, that crime, disorder, and
urban health are inextricably and causally linked.' ° The social norms scholars
who champion order-maintenance policies reason that disorder leads to more
serious crimes because it has a negative social influence effect. Unchecked
disorder signals that a community does not-or cannot-enforce the basic
norms of civil society. As a result, disorder "erode[s] deterrence by
emboldening law-breakers and demoralizing law-abiders."'.. Thus,
government intervention to check physical and social disorder in city
neighborhoods should not only help reverse the spiral of urban decline but also
should prevent more serious crimes. The effectiveness of order-maintenance
policies, however, is hotly contested. Proponents cite empirical evidence
supporting the crime-disorder nexus -including Wesley Skogan's influential
work' 2 and the apparent correlation between New York City's dramatic crime-
rate reduction and the implementation of aggressive order-maintenance
policing policies.' 3 These empirical claims have been challenged, however,
notably by Bernard Harcourt, who has questioned Skogan's data and, more
recently, has proffered a serious counter-explanation for the New York City
experience.14
This debate is a critically important one, but it does not speak directly to
what might be called the potential "land use" benefits of the order-
1OO. See Livingston, supra note 76, at 578-84 (reviewing the literature).
101. Kahan, supra note 13, at 387.
102. WESLEY G. SKOGAN, DISORDER AND DECLINE: CRIME AND THE SPIRAL OF DECAY IN AMERICAN
NEIGHBORHOODS (1990).
1O3. See, e.g., GEORGE L. KELLING & CATHERINE M. COLES, FIXING BROKEN WINDOWS:
RESTORING ORDER AND REDUCING CRIME IN OUR COMMUNITIES 108-56 (1996); Hope
Corman & Naci Mocan, Carrots, Sticks, and Broken Windows, 48 J.L. & ECON. 235 (2005);
Kahan, supra note 13, at 367-73; George L. Kelling & William H. Sousa, Jr., Do Police
Matter?: An Analysis of the Impact of New York City's Police Reforms (Manhattan Inst. Ctr. for
Civic Innovation, Civic Report No. 22, 2001).
104. See BERNARD E. HARCOURT, ILLUSION OF ORDER: THE FALSE PROMISE OF BROKEN WINDOWS
POLICING 59-78 (2001) (disputing Skogan's data); Bernard E. Harcourt & Jens Ludwig,
Broken Windows: New Evidence from New York City and a Five-City Social Experiment, 73 U.
CHI. L. REv. 271, 287-300 (2oo6) (arguing that New York City's dramatic decline in crime
can be explained by "mean reversion" -that crime rates were returning to natural averages
following an unusual spike in past years); see also Steven D. Levitt, Understanding Why
Crime Fell in the 199os: Four Factors That Explain the Decline and Six That Do Not, J. ECON.
PERSP., Winter 2004, at 163, 172, 176-83 (rejecting "better policing strategies" as an
explanation for the drop in crime rates and offering four counter-explanations: more police,
higher incarceration rates, the decline in the crack epidemic, and legalized abortion); cf.
Robert J. Sampson & Stephen W. Raudenbush, Systematic Social Observation of Public
Spaces: A New Look at Disorder in Urban Neighborhoods, 105 Am. J. Soc. 603, 628, 637 (1999)
(finding that disorder was correlated with robbery but not with other serious crimes).
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maintenance agenda. The original Broken Windows essay urged that attention
to disorder was important not just because disorder was a precursor to more
serious crime, but also because disorder undermined residents' sense of
security.'l5 The later scholarly explications of the broken windows hypothesis
also emphasize the connection between restoring the perception of security and
its reality. '6 One reason that social norms scholars link disorder and crime is
disorder's predictable effect on law-abiding citizens: those with financial
resources move away from, or choose not to move into, disorderly
neighborhoods; those without resources remain inside and avoid public places.
Even if these reactions (somewhat surprisingly) do not lead to more crime in a
community by increasing the concentration of individuals with criminal
propensities, ' 7 they certainly disadvantage city neighborhoods vis-a-vis their
suburban alternatives. .8
Moreover, and importantly, the goals of reducing crime and of helping
poor, inner-city residents feel better about, and more invested in, their current
communities are not necessarily coterminous; order-maintenance policies
might achieve the latter without achieving the former. In other words, it might
be the case that order-maintenance policies do not curb serious crime and that
they make cities more attractive places to live, thereby improving the lives of
current residents and helping them compete with suburban alternatives.
Survey evidence suggesting both that residents' perceptions of security do not
map neatly onto crime rates and that residents regard safety as one of the
primary factors affecting housing choice tends to support this conclusion. °9
1os. See Wilson & Kelling, supra note 98.
1o6. See Livingston, supra note 76, at 581.
107. See Nicole Stelle Garnett, Relocating Disorder, 91 VA. L. REV. 1075, 1115-17 (2005) (discussing
the risks of concentrated disorder).
lo8. See Kahan, supra note 13, at 371.
log. On the perception of security versus its reality, see, for example, CHI. CMTY. POLICING
EVALUATION CONSORTIUM, COMMUNITY POLICING IN CHICAGO, YEAR TEN: AN EVALUATION
OF CHICAGO'S ALTERNATIVE POLICING STRATEGY 66 (2004), available at
http://www.northwestem.edu/ipr/publications/policing-papers/Yro-CAPSeval.pdf. Several
surveys identify safety as a factor influencing housing choice. See, e.g., NAT'L ASS'N OF HOME
BUILDERS, 2005 MULTIFAMILY RENTERAND CONDO BUYER PREFERENCE SURVEY 20-21 (2005),
available at http://www.nahb.org/generic.aspx ?genericContentlD=46 103; PUB. POLICY INST.
OF CAL., SPECIAL SURVEY ON LAND USE 7 (2002), available at http://www.ppic.org/content/
pubs/survey/S_11o2MBS.pdf (concluding from a survey of 2010 California residents that
"when it comes to choosing a home and neighborhood, two issues [other than price] remain
consistently at the top of the list for all residents -safety and living space"); Lee Sigelman &
Jeffrey R. Henig, Crossing the Great Divide: Race and Preferences for Living in the City Versus
the Suburbs, 37 URB. AFF. REV. 3, 7-8 (2001) (finding that both African-American and white
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Unfortunately, not enough is known about how the order-maintenance
agenda fares as land use policy. It is reasonable to speculate that urban disorder
affects cities' ability to compete with suburbs for residents and businesses
under some circumstances. That is, above a certain threshold, pervasive
disorder undoubtedly drives some people to move to the suburbs-and
decreases the quality of life for those who remain. But it is also reasonable to
assume that some level of ambient disorder is tolerable, even enlivening, to
those who enjoy city life. Moreover, the order-maintenance literature
frequently glosses over important definitional difficulties: What is "disorder"?
Which kinds of "disorder" - physical, social, aesthetic, criminal-matter and
which do not? ' These questions are important ones, especially because, as
discussed below, many city land use policies equate economic activity with
disorder and therefore stifle city busyness in the name of city safety.
B. Safety and Busyness
While Kotkin suggests that a renewed emphasis on safety may have helped
some cities rebound in recent years, Bruegmann attributes positive trends in
urban development entirely to economic forces-the decline in the urban
industrial base, changes in residential preferences, and an increase in the
number of Americans wealthy enough to enjoy urban life. Bruegmann's neglect
of order-maintenance policies is unfortunate, if understandable. It is
unfortunate because the apparent success of the order-maintenance agenda (as
a land use policy, if not as a criminal law policy) suggests that restrictions on
suburban growth are not necessarily the only way to renew urban fortunes. It
is understandable because someone who rejects urban exceptionalism would
not be expected to pay much attention to policies primarily aimed at restoring
the health of urban neighborhoods. Moreover, for many of the same reasons
that he raises red flags about the growth management agenda, Bruegmann
might worry about the potential costs of order-maintenance policies " '-
residents of the Washington, D.C., area ranked the suburbs higher than the city in terms of
safety).
11o. See, e.g., Robert J. Sampson & Stephen W. Raudenbush, Seeing Disorder: Neighborhood
Stigma and the Social Construction of "Broken Windows," 67 Soc. PSYCHOL. Q 319, 319, 336
(2004) (examining what kinds of disorder trigger "broken windows" problems and
concluding that perceptions of disorder are linked to race); see also SKOGAN, supra note 102,
at 21-50 (describing the effects of various kinds of disorder on neighborhood life).
iii. Opponents worry that order-maintenance policies raise serious civil liberties concerns, both
because they tend to target poor, minority communities and because they increase the level
of police-citizen interaction. See, e.g., HARCOURT, supra note 104, at 127-38; David Cole,
Foreword: Discretion and Discrimination Reconsidered: A Response to the New Criminal Justice
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perhaps their potential downsides are unjustifiable if we should be
unconcerned with the health of cities qua cities.
Finally, of course, the order-maintenance agenda usually is considered a
criminal law matter, which explains why Kotkin's general history of urban life
discusses it and Bruegmann's more narrow treatment of land use trends does
not. Land use scholars -especially growth management skeptics like
Bruegmann -should, however, pay more attention to the order-maintenance
agenda. Not only might efforts to suppress urban disorder help city
neighborhoods attract new residents, partially negating the case for suburban
growth restrictions, but many order-maintenance policies are land use
policies.11 The order-maintenance agenda encompasses physical as well as
social disorder, and many cities incorporate the vigorous enforcement of
property regulations into their disorder-suppression arsenal.1 3
Moreover, the order-maintenance agenda intersects with efforts to promote
city busyness in at least three important and understudied ways. First, safer
cities are likely to be busier cities. Fear of crime and disorder drives many
people with choices away from cities: residents move to safer neighborhoods,
often in the suburbs; businesses also relocate, responding to the fear of
property crime, high insurance rates, and pressure from present and would-be
employees and customers. For the reasons discussed above, successful efforts
to improve security-or at least the perception of security-may convince
residents and businesses to make cities their home again. Second, busier cities
are likely to be safer cities. As Jane Jacobs influentially hypothesized, the
complexity and diversity of healthy urban life guarantees the presence of many
Scholarship, 87 GEO. L.J. 1059, lO62 (1999); Carol S. Steiker, More Wrong than Rights, in
URGENT TIMES: POLICING AND RIGHTS IN INNER-CITY COMMUNITIES 49, 49-57 (Tracey L.
Meares & Dan M. Kahan eds., 1999). Proponents counter that poor, minority residents
overwhelmingly support order-maintenance policies. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan & Tracey L.
Meares, Foreword: The Coming Crisis of Criminal Procedure, 86 GEO. L.J. 1153, 1160-71 (1998);
Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan, When Rights Are Wrong: The Paradox of Unwanted
Rights, in URGENT TIMEs, supra, at 3, 3-30. Order-maintenance policies also are resource-
intensive and therefore expensive, see, e.g., Kelling & Sousa, supra note 103, at 1, leading
opponents to express concern that these policies divert police attention away from serious
crimes, see, e.g., Harcourt & Ludwig, supra note 104, at 314-15.
112. See Robert C. Ellickson, Controlling Chronic Misconduct in City Spaces: Of Panhandlers, Skid
Rows, and Public-Space Zoning, 105 YAuE L.J. 1165, 1171 (1996) ("A specialist in property law
approaches the issue of street order as a problem ... of land management."); Nicole Stelle
Garnett, Ordering (and Order in) the City, 57 STAN. L. REv. 1, 3 (2004) ("Largely missing from
the academic debate about these developments is a discussion of the complex and important
role of property regulation in order-maintenance efforts."); Neal Kumar Karyal, Architecture
as Crime Control, iii YALE L.J. 1039, 1101-22 (2002) (discussing ways in which property
regulation could be used to deter crime).
113. See Garnett, supra note 112, at 11-21.
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private "eyes upon the street" that serve to keep crime and disorder in check. ' 4
Third, and perhaps most importantly, a city government determined to impose
order may-tragically, in my view-mistake busyness for disorder and seek to
suppress it.
As I have written elsewhere, there is a risk that local government officials
may conclude that zoning's segregation of land uses will suppress the physical
and social disorders targeted by order-maintenance policies."' Anecdotal
evidence suggests, for example, that many cities consider the aggressive
enforcement of property regulations, including zoning regulations, an
important order-maintenance priority." 6 These policies are in keeping with
one of zoning laws' foundational assumptions - namely, the equation of
economic activity with social disorder. As Richard Chused has persuasively
argued, the Progressives who promoted zoning in the early decades of the
twentieth century were "positive environmentalists." They believed that the
busyness of urban life- characterized by the mixing of commercial and
residential land uses-degraded human character and that changing the
physical surroundings of a community to a single-use suburban model would
nurture good citizens. " '
The zoning regulations codifying these assumptions have proven
stubbornly resistant to change over the past century. Many city officials resist
even incremental reforms to zoning rules, such as the liberalization of home
business regulations."1' There are a number of reasons to question the
regulatory status quo, however. While zoning laws proceed from the
assumption that ordered land uses suppress disorder, the relationship between
land use patterns and disorder is a complicated one, especially in urban
communities. Some studies do suggest the presence of more observable
114. JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES 40-45 (1993).
11S. See Garnett, supra note 112, at 21-23.
116. See id. at 22 (discussing the incorporation of zoning enforcement into multi-agency code-
enforcement "sweeps"). In Georgia, a recently elected official promised in an op-ed that
"[b]y putting more resources into enforcing the county's zoning ordinance ... we can create
an environment where it will be more difficult for crime to take root." Mike Beaudreau,
Gwinnett Opinions: Citizens Can Expect Changes for the Better, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Jan. 2,
2005, at J4; see also Ginny Skalski, City Picks Baker; Crime Tops Agenda, HERALD-SUN
(Durham), Jan. 15, 2005, at Al (reporting that the city manager's top crime-reduction
priorities included zoning enforcement).
117. Richard H. Chused, Euclid's Historical Imagery, 51 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 597, 6oi (2001).
118. See, e.g., Nicole Stelle Garnett, On Castles and Commerce: Zoning Law and the Home-Business
Dilemma, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1191, 1233 (2001) (discussing resistance to regulatory
reform in the home business context).
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disorder in mixed land use environments." 9 On the other hand, by prohibiting
a mixing of land uses, zoning may deprive urban neighborhoods of economic
vitality, which, as Kotkin demonstrates, is one of the most important
prerequisites of healthy cities. Moreover, property regulations are enormously
costly. Housing and building codes, for example, frequently are indicted for
contributing to the problem of vacant and abandoned property in city
neighborhoods. 120  Zoning regulations impose additional expenses-from
cumbersome off-street parking requirements to limits on home businesses-
that may prove cost-prohibitive, especially for would-be entrepreneurs in city
neighborhoods.12' To the extent that these regulations depress economic
activity in city neighborhoods, they may also contribute to the social disorder
associated with joblessness. 2 2 Finally, cities seeking to impose "order" through
the aggressive enforcement of traditional zoning rules may undermine their
ability to compete with their suburban neighbors. Bruegmann may be right
that cities will survive (and be revived) if, and perhaps only if, some subset of
would-be residents prefer the (somewhat disorderly) aesthetic of urban life.
But cities are unlikely to capture that demographic by seeking-through the
enforcement of zoning laws - to become more like suburbs.
A number of commentators have noted the difficulty of defining the
appropriate universe of "disorder[s]" that are socially problematic.2 3 One
unfortunate manifestation of this confusion is that city policymakers may be
overinclusive and mistake "busyness" for disorder in need of suppression. Land
use reforms that reject the traditional assumption that ordered land uses
119. See Sampson & Raudenbush, supra note 104, at 624.
120. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 470-74 (4th ed. 1992)
(attributing the shortage of affordable housing to housing codes); STEPHEN R. SEIDEL,
HOUSING COSTS AND GOVERNMENT REGULATIONS: CONFRONTING THE REGULATORY MAZE
73-77, 90 (1978) (arguing that building codes introduce distortions into the housing
market); Peter D. Salins, Reviving New York City's Housing Market, in HOUSING AND
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT IN NEW YORK CITY 53, 54-55 (Michael H. Schill ed., 1999)
(blaming New York City's housing shortage in part on overly complex building
regulations); Sara C. Galvan, Note, Rehabilitating Rehab Through State Building Codes, i11
YALE L.J. 1744 (2006) (arguing that traditional building codes impede rehabilitation efforts
in center cities).
121. See Gamett, supra note 112, at 26-40.
122. See, e.g., MiRUAM EREZ & P. CHRISTOPHER EARLEY, CULTURE, SELF-IDENTITY, AND WORK 28-
29 (1993) (describing the connection between self-efficacy, vicarious experience, and
performance); WILSON, supra note 50, at 51-86 (discussing the effects of chronic joblessness
in the inner city); Robert J. Sampson, Urban Black Violence: The Effect of Male Joblessness and
Family Disruption, 93 AM. J. Soc. 348 (1987) (connecting male joblessness, family
breakdown, and youth violence).
123. E.g., Sampson & Raudenbush, supra note 104, at 619-22.
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suppress social disorder represent one promising alternative to growth
controls, which seek to foster "busyness" by channeling new development into
the urban core. These reforms would also be in keeping with Bruegmann's
views on land use policy: he obviously has a more robust faith in free market
forces than many land use scholars. And his opposition to growth management
is motivated in large part by a concern about the effects of development
restrictions on the urban poor. Unfortunately, however, Bruegmann contents
himself with criticizing growth-control proponents for manipulating the
regulatory processes to their advantage.' 4 The regulatory choices supported by
these relatively wealthy insiders are not surprising, nor are city governments'
tendencies to respond to their demands. It is entirely predictable that city land
use policies reflect the preferences of established interests, especially property
owners who tend to favor single-use zoning and relatively low densities.
Bruegmann misses an opportunity to better explain why these particular
regulatory choices are suboptimal for cities and their residents. His case for
unrestricted suburban growth could have been strengthened by a parallel case
against cumbersome restrictions on urban land uses. By making city
neighborhoods busier, the latter reforms could both improve the lives of the
urban poor and enable cities to compete more effectively with suburbs.
C. Busyness, Sacredness, and Beauty
Currently the dominant alternative to use-based zoning is promoted by
"new urbanist" planners who advocate replacing single-use zones with mixed
land use environments. New urbanists argue that cities should regulate
property based upon building form, not building use. 25 For example, architect
Andrds Duany's "SmartCode" proceeds upon the assumption that development
naturally progresses from urban (most intense) to rural (least intense). Duany
calls this progression the "transect" and urges cities to replace use zoning with
the regulation of building form appropriate to the various "transect zones"
along the progression. '  Theoretically, the concept is relatively simple:
buildings appropriate for the city center should go in the city center (regardless
of what they are used for); suburban buildings should look suburban. New
urbanists promise that their system of regulation promotes careful planning
124. See BRUEGMANN, supra note I, at 57-58.
125. See, e.g., Peter Katz, Form First: The New Urbanist Alternative to Conventional Zoning,
PLANNING, Nov. 2004, at 16, 18-20 (describing the merits of form-based coding).
126. ANDRtS DUANY ET AL., SYARTCODE & MANUAL VERSION 8.0, at C2 (2006) ("A code, once
adopted as law, stays in place, allowing urbanism to evolve and mature without losing its
sense of order.").
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that balances the need for city busyness with the concern about urban
disorder. 127
Bruegmann, it is fair to say, is disdainful of the new urbanism, which he
dismisses as an aesthetic critique of suburbia. '28 Kotkin also expresses a
cautious skepticism of the movement, worrying that new urbanists "rarely refer
to the need for a powerful moral vision to hold cities together."' 2 9 Both
critiques, in my view, discount the value of the new urbanists' insights. The
new urbanists are today's positive environmentalists. They connect city
busyness and architectural beauty to the shared sense of purpose that Kotkin
equates with modern city "sacredness. 1 30 While Progressive reformers linked
the geographic segregation of the family home from commerce and industry to
the cultivation of a correct moral constitution, 3' new urbanists believe that
single-use zoning corrupts our souls. New urbanists assert-among other
things -that the heterogeneity of city life, not the homogeneity of suburbs, is
conducive to true community life.132 Building on Jane Jacobs's central insight,
they reason that mixed-use environments foster healthy communities by
providing opportunities for informal social interaction that are lacking in
single-use, suburban-style development. Thus, while Kotkin is correct that the
new urbanists do not necessarily promote the "powerful moral vision" that he
equates with city sacredness, they claim that traditional urban design fosters a
richer, more inclusive community life than the privatized suburban realm.
1 33
And while Bruegmann is right that the movement promotes a certain aesthetic,
the heart of the new urbanists' claim is that their urban aesthetic draws people
together (and that the dominant suburban aesthetic pulls them apart).
The new urbanists have made valuable contributions to thinking about
urban development in recent decades. Nearly a century of single-use zoning
has shaped our cities and suburbs-and our views about cities and suburbs-
127. See DUANY, PLATER-ZYBERK & Co., THE LEXICON OF THE NEW URBANISM C3.2 (2002);
Andr~s Duany & Emily Talen, Transect Planning, J. Am. PLAN. ASS'N, 245, 247-49 (2002);
Chad D. Emerson, Making Main Street Legal Again: The SmartCode Solution to Sprawl, 71
Mo. L. REv. 637 (2006).
128. See BRUEGMANN, supra note 1, at 150-53.
129. KOTKIN, supra note 1, at 158.
130. See, e.g., GERALD E. FRUG, CITY MAKING: BUILDING COMMUNITIES WITHOUT BUILDING
WALLS 149-54 (1999) (describing the goals and principles of the new urbanism).
131. See, e.g., Martha A. Lees, Preserving Property Values? Preserving Proper Homes? Preserving
Privilege?: The Pre-Euclid Debate over Zoning for Exclusively Private Residential Areas, 1916-
1926, 56 U. PiTr. L. REv. 367, 415-33 (1994).
132. See FRUG, supra note 13o, at 125-29, 138-42, 149-54.
133. See id. at 149-64.
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and new urbanists mount a serious challenge to these longstanding practices
and assumptions. In many ways, the new urbanism parallels the broken
windows hypothesis: it runs contrary to prevailing wisdom, is intuitively
attractive, and is difficult to test empirically.'3 4 Even Bruegmann grudgingly
recognizes that the new urbanists have "struck a chord with many people."'3
Indeed, even those who remain unconvinced by the new urbanists' grandiose
claims that more "urban" community design will make us better, more
complete people,13 6 cannot help but be moved by Jacobs's classic description of
the good urban life.'37 And, while Bruegmann is correct to observe that the new
urbanists have done more to remake the face of suburbia than to turn around
the fate of major cities, he likely underestimates the extent to which new
urbanism is influencing urban infill efforts in many cities-or the connections
between the nostalgia for the "old neighborhood" and the market for new
neighborhoods that look old.
Unfortunately, as the saying goes, the devil is in the details. And the new
urbanists' alternative to zoning is detailed indeed. The movement is dominated
by architects, and new urbanist coding consequently relies heavily on detailed
architectural design standards. Moreover, political resistance to scrapping
traditional zoning usually guarantees that these standards tend to supplement,
rather than supplant, traditional zoning tools when they are adopted.' 38 New
urbanists have specific ideas about how buildings should look: ugly,
unwelcoming buildings, in their view, can be just as detrimental to community
as sterile, single-use planning. For example, the regulatory code for the Park
East redevelopment district in Milwaukee-a project initiated by the city's
former mayor, John Norquist, who is now president of the Congress for the
New Urbanism- includes hundreds of pages of architectural renderings and
photographs of "appropriate" building types. '39 New urbanist coding promises
to make some city projects- including infill efforts and mixed-income public
housing developments -look very nice. But complying with these design
134, See, e.g., Harcourt & Ludwig, supra note 104, at 315 (recounting James O. Wilson's
observation that the broken windows hypothesis was based upon "speculation").
135. BRUEGMANN, supra note 1, at 151.
136. See, e.g., Philip Bess, The Polis and Natural Law: The Moral Authority of the Urban Transect, in
TILL WE HAvE BUILT JERUSALEM (forthcoming 2006) (manuscript on file with author).
137. See JACOBS, supra note 114; see also Douglas Martin, Jane Jacobs, 89, Who Saw Future in Cities,
Is Dead, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2oo6, at Ai (describing Jacobs's influence).
138. See Emerson, supra note 127, at 671-75.
139. See City of Milwaukee, Dep't of City Dev., Park East, http://,wNw.mkedcd.org/parkeast/
index.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2006).
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standards may prove daunting and expensive, especially for those without
financial means or formal education. 14o
Just as it is important to rethink how land use rules mediate the
relationship between busyness and safety, city leaders must also consider the
tensions and intersections between busyness, beauty, and "sacredness" -
especially before endorsing new urbanist coding as an alternative to zoning.
Here, Kotkin's conception of city "sacredness" is instructive. Kotkin describes a
cultural, not an aesthetic, phenomenon. His "sacredness" is an expression of
the kind of social capital that correlates with, and is promoted by, healthy city
life. 41 Architectural beauty may indeed help build such social capital. Certainly
the claim that we are inspired and drawn together by beautiful places and
beautiful buildings rings true. Architecture historically served to emphasize the
"sacredness" of cities: the beauty of the cathedral, the mosque, or the temple
reminded citizens of their common bonds and responsibilities.142 Perhaps new
urbanist coding also will help cities capitalize on urban distinctiveness while
preventing physical disorder, thereby promoting urban competitiveness. On
the other hand, the goals of busyness and beauty may sometimes conflict, with
complex architectural standards standing as yet another impediment to urban
reinvestment. By seeking to dictate the details of what a busy and "sacred"
neighborhood should look like, new urbanists' proposals may backfire, further
depressing urban development hopes, especially in the poorest communities.
In my view, when beauty conflicts with busyness, cities must prioritize
busyness, for at least two related reasons. First, busyness is an important
element of city-suburb competition: higher density, mixed-use urban
environments are increasingly rare, even countercultural in our culture of
sprawl. Our cities' best hope is that some subset of Americans continues to
prefer density and busyness to tranquility and openness. Second, city busyness
is critical to building Kotkin's urban "sacredness." Busy streets encourage the
140. See, e.g., Joseph E. Gyourko & Witold Rybczynski, Financing New Urbanism Projects:
Obstacles and Solutions, ii HOUSING POL'Y DEBATE 733, 739-40 (2000) (concluding, based on
an extensive survey of builders and developers, that new urbanist projects are more
expensive); Philip Langdon, The Not-So-Secret Code: Across the U.S., Form-Based Codes Are
Putting New Urbanist Ideas into Practice, PLANNING, Jan. 2006, at 24, 28 (asserting that the
cost of form-based codes "exceeds that of a conventional land-use plan" making citywide
form-based coding "prohibitively expensive"); see also NEw URBANISM: COMPREHENSIVE
REPORT AND BEST PR cTICES GUIDE § 14-8 (Robert Stenteville ed., 2d ed. 2001) (describing
new urbanist developments in which design costs were $4000 per house, compared to
approximately $40 per house in conventional developments).
141. See, e.g., RAE, supra note 22, at 181-82 (describing how urban life generates social capital).
142. See KOTKIN, supra note 1, at 28-29 (describing ancient Rome); id. at 45-46 (describing the
medieval Islamic city); id. at 53-55 (describing the great capitals of the Chinese Middle
Kingdom as the "astral center of the universal order").
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informal social interactions that, to borrow from Robert Putnam, bind similar
people together and bridge groups of different people. 143 And, of course, few
would challenge the suggestion that a lack of busyness in the poorest
neighborhoods impedes the development of social capital, encourages
lawlessness, and promotes hopelessness. In these places, city leaders should not
neglect the possibility that the incremental deregulation of certain land uses
might prove more advisable than substituting a new kind of mandated order
for the more familiar one imposed by zoning.
CONCLUSION
For the better part of the past century, land use laws sought to impose
suburban land use patterns in our cities. Today, growth-control proponents
seek to renew our cities by restricting suburban growth in order to promote
denser urban land use patterns. Robert Bruegmann challenges the
conventional wisdom supporting the latter course of action. His case against
growth restrictions is a powerful one, and he convincingly argues that suburbs
are neither bad nor out of control. But Bruegmann's effort to change the terms
of the debate by urging readers to reconsider city exceptionality fails. It is
possible to agree with Bruegmann's descriptive account of the pace, scale, and
benefits of suburban development and also to believe that cities, by virtue of
their density and busyness, foster a kind of social capital-what Kotkin would
call "sacredness" -that is worth preserving and fostering. Moreover, even those
who agree with Bruegmann that cities and suburbs are simply part of the same
economic continuum likely harbor concerns about the fate of the urban poor.
Neither view requires the endorsement of suburban growth restrictions,
especially in light of their possible distributional consequences. Given the risks
attendant to growth management, advocates of urban life might first ask
whether changing city land use policies to embrace this urban distinctiveness
could do more to save our cities than limiting the choices of those who prefer
to live in the suburbs. To accomplish this goal, city leaders must carefully
consider how land use regulations might be amended to encourage land use
patterns appropriate for an urban environment. Possible reforms range from
the sweeping - the widespread adoption of mixed-use zoning, for example - to
the incremental- eliminating off-street parking requirements, permitting
shallower setbacks from streets, and relaxing restrictions on home businesses.
143. See ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN
COMMUNITY 18-24 (2000) (defining social capital).
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In the end, however, competition between cities and suburbs cannot turn
on land use strategies alone. Suburbs thrive not simply because Americans
prefer suburban land use patterns (although that is undoubtedly an important
factor), but also because they offer many amenities that cities do not. If cities
are to compete for residents, other reforms -especially to education, public
works, and the delivery of city services-also may prove necessary.144 More
Americans have lived in the suburbs than in central cities since 1970,14' and
many of them would never consider living anywhere else. But Kotkin's book
serves as a reminder-contra Bruegmann-that the city/suburb distinction
turns on more than population densities and aesthetic preferences. The path to
urban success may be to demonstrate to our suburban nation that cities offer
something suburbs cannot-the complex web of social and economic
relationships and the genuine love of, and commitment to, urban life that
characterizes great cities.
144. Local government reforms, including business improvement districts, tax increment
financing, and other "sublocal" governance innovations, have achieved some success in
many cities. See Richard Briffault, The Rise of Sublocal Structures in Urban Governance, 82
MINN. L. REV. 503 (1997).
145. See MULLER, supra note 84, at 4.
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